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MESSAGE SPACES FOR PERFECT CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
SHUROJIT CHATTERJI AND SRIHARI GOVINDAN
Abstract. We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N -person game, as defined by
Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the
message space.
1. Introduction
Dhillon and Mertens (1996; henceforth, DM) introduced the concept of perfect correlated equilibria (PCE)
as a refinement of correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974)—see the Introduction to DM for a rationale for
this refinement. DM define a PCE as a perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) of an extended game obtained
by using a correlation device. A perfect correlated equilibrium distribution (PCED) is then a correlated
equilibrium distribution that is achievable as a perfect equilibrium of some extended game. DM also provided
a characterization of PCEDs of two-player games using a canonical message space. In this paper, we provide
an extension of their result to the N -player case.
Using a simple two-player game, DM show that the direction revelation principle fails to hold for PCEDs,
i.e., certain PCEDs are not obtainable by using the strategy space as the message space. The reason for
this failure is that players need more “coordinates” in their messages to encode information about how they
are to tremble. For the two player case, DM show that the two-fold product of the strategy space suffices
as the message space. Here, we analyze the N -person case and show (Theorem 3.1) that every PCED can
be obtained using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. We also provide a
heuristic argument that strongly suggests the possibility that using just two copies will not be enough in
general.
The messages that support a PCE in our construct are L-tuples (for some positive integer L) of pure
strategies for each player that actually represent a hierarchy of beliefs of his opponents about what he
would play when he gets a message. Unfortunately, the number L depends on the particular PCED under
consideration and hence we have not been able to get a uniform bound for it. We hope that future work will
be able to provide a tight bound for the dimension of the message spaces derived here.
2. Definitions
Let Γ be a a finite normal form game with player set N = { 1, . . . , N }. For each player n, let Sn be
his finite set of pure strategies; and let S =
∏
n∈N Sn. For any finite set X, denote by Σ(X) the set of all
probability distributions over X. For simplicity, we will write Σn to denote the set Σ(Sn) of mixed strategies
of player n.
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where for each n, Mn is player n’s finite
message space, and P is a probability distribution on M =
∏
nMn. Given a correlation device, one defines
an extended game Γd as follows: first nature chooses a message m ∈ M according to P and informs each
player of his coordinate of m; then, the players play Γ . Thus, a pure strategy for player n in Γd is a function
τn :Mn → Sn, and payoffs are defined by taking expectations w.r.t. P .
Definition 2.1. A perfect correlated equilibrium (PCE) of Γ is a pair (d, τ) where d is a correlation device
and τ is a perfect equilibrium of the game Γd. The distribution over S induced by τ is called a perfect
correlated equilibrium distribution (PCED).
In defining PCEDs, it is irrelevant whether we consider the normal form or the extensive form perfect
equilibria of Γd. Indeed, in the extensive form of the the game Γd, no information set of a player succeeds
another one of his. Hence, the normal form and the extensive form perfect equilibria of Γd coincide. Concep-
tually, it is simpler to view the perfect equilibria of Γd as being in behavioural strategies, which are functions
from the message spaces of players to their sets of mixed strategies in Γ . Throughout this paper, therefore,
we will be working with behavioural strategies in the extended game.
3. Canonical Message Spaces
The main result of our paper is the following theorem showing that every PCED can be achieved using a
finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space.
Theorem 3.1. µ ∈ Σ(S) is a PCED if and only if there exists a positive integer L and a device d = (SL, P )
such that:
(α) The marginal distribution of P on the first factor is µ, i.e., µ(s1) =
∑
s2,...,sL P (s
1, s2, . . . , sL) for all
s1 ∈ S.




n is a perfect equilibrium of Γd. More precisely,
there exists a sequence
(
ε0(k), . . . , εL−1(k)
)
in (0, 1)L converging to zero such that ρ is a best reply
against every element of the following sequence of completely mixed strategies: given the message
(s1n, . . . , s
L
n), player n plays the uniform strategy in Σn with probability ε
0(k) and with probability
(1− ε0(k)) plays the strategy that is the nested combination (ε1(k), . . . , εL−1(k))(s1n, . . . , sLn) given
by(
1− ε1(k)) s1n+ε1(k) [(1− ε2(k)) s2n + ε2(k) [· · ·+ εL−2(k) [(1− εL−1(k)) sL−1n + εL−1(k)sLn] · · · ]] .
The proof of the Theorem relies crucially on the following Lemma, which is a minor variant of Proposition
2 in Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991). The only difference is that they consider a sequence of
probability distributions while we consider a sequence of vectors of probability distributions. It is easily
verified that their proof applies to our case as well; therefore, we omit the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let X1, . . . , XI be a finite collection of finite sets. Let µ(k) be a sequence in
∏I
i=1 Σ(Xi).
Then there exist (i) a positive integer L 6
∑
i |Xi|; (ii) for each l = 1, . . . , L, a vector µl in
∏I
i=1 Σ(Xi);
and (iii) a sequence (ε1(k), . . . , εL−1(k)) in (0, 1)L−1 converging to zero such that a subsequence of µ(k) is
expressible as the nested combination (ε1(k), . . . , εL−1(k))(µ1, . . . , µL).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. The sufficiency of our condition is obvious. We will therefore prove its necessity.




is the correlation device. There exists a
sequence τ(k) of completely mixed behavioural strategies in Γd converging to τ such that τ is a best reply
against every element of the sequence. Express τ(k) as (1 − ε0(k))τ˜(k) + ε0(k)τ∗ where τ∗ is the uniform
strategy profile and ε0(k) is a sequence of positive numbers converging to zero. We then have that the limit
of the sequence of τ˜(k) is τ . Viewing τ˜(k) as a sequence in
∏
n (Σn)
Mn we can now apply Lemma 3.2 to
obtain: (i) an integer L; (ii) for each l = 1 . . . , L, n ∈ N and mn ∈ Mn a mixed strategy τ lmn in Σn; and
(iii) a sequence ε(k) in (0, 1)L−1 converging to zero, such that (by replacing the sequence of τ˜(k)’s with
an appropriate subsequence) we have that for each n, mn, τ˜mn(k) = (ε
1(k), . . . , εL−1(k))(τ1mn , . . . , τLmn).
Obviously, τ1mn is the limit of the sequence τ˜mn(k), which by construction is τmn .





and the lottery, call it P˜ , on M˜ =
∏
n M˜n is obtained by first choosing m according to P and then, given
m, choosing for each player n, and each l = 1, . . . , L, a pure strategy sln according to τ
l
mn . Consider the
following pure strategy ρ in Γd˜: given the message (mn, s
1
n, . . . , s
L
n), player n plays s
1
n. By construction,
the distribution on Σ that is induced by (d˜, ρ) is µ. We claim now that ρ is a perfect equilibrium of Γd˜.
Indeed, it follows again from the construction above that ρ is a best reply against the following sequence
ρ(k) of completely mixed strategy profiles: given a message (mn, s1n, . . . , s
L
n), player n plays the uniform
mixture over Sn with probability ε0(k) and with probability (1 − ε0(k)) plays the the nested combination
(ε1(k), . . . , εL−1(k))(s1n, . . . , sLn).
Observe that both the pure strategy ρ and the the sequence ρ(k) are implementable even if we do not
inform the players of the original messages mn. Moreover, ρ would, a fortiori, be a best reply against the
sequence—players have fewer strategies available now. Thus, deleting the original messages from M˜ yields
the result. 
Remark. In the two-player case, the integer L in the statement of Theorem 3.1 can be taken to be 2.
Indeed, in the Proof above, every element of the sequence of τ(k)’s can be chosen as a convex combination
of τ and a fixed, completely mixed strategy. Therefore, the sequence τ˜(k) can be taken to be of the form
(1 − 1(k))τ + 1(k)τ ′ for some mixed strategy τ ′ and some sequence of 1(k)’s converging to zero. Thus,
τ˜(k) is the nested combination 1(k)(τ, τ ′). In other words, L can be be taken to be 2.1
4. Discussion
Theorem 3.1 not only provides a canonical message space for achieving a PCED, but also provides a
description of a sequence of perturbed strategies that renders the correlated equilibrium perfect. Given the
message (s1n, . . . , s
L
n) player n plays the pure strategy s
1
n. All the other players, on the other hand, believe
that player n might play any of the coordinates with positive probability but that the probability of sln is
infinitely smaller than that of sl−1n for each l > 1. Thus, modulo the fact that each player plays the uniform
strategy with a small probability—and this, only for the technical reason that the strategies in the game Γd
have to be completely mixed—the vector (s1n, . . . , s
L
n) represents a hierarchy of beliefs of the other players,
in the sense of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991).
1This argument is essentially the same as the one used by DM in their characterization of PCEDS for two player games.
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In terms of its interpretation, the DM characterization of the PCEDs of two-player games is similar.
However, their result is stronger in the sense that the message space can be taken to be S × S. The reason
for this difference is the equivalence between perfection and admissibility in the two-player case: it suffices
for either player to have only one alternative theory about his opponent’s behaviour in the extended game.
The nonlinearities involved in the N -person case means that such a result is not possible. To see why this
is the case, consider an N -player game and a finite collection of perfect equilibria in all of which, one of the
players, say player 1, plays a pure strategy, say T. If we are to implement a convex combination of these
equilibria using only two copies of S, then player 1’s message space would be of the same dimension as his
strategy space. Suppose now that this player has two other pure strategies, M and B. Furthermore, suppose
that each of the perfect equilibria requires that the relative magnitudes of the trembles, εM and εB , resp., for
M and B, are different across equilibria. Specifically, one equilibrium requires that εM = εB , another that
ε2M = εB , etc. (Such conditions are possible in the N -person case, since it is possible that for one player’s
equilibrium strategy to be a best reply, the probability that player 1 deviates to B is of the same order as
the probability that he deviates to M and a certain subset of the others also deviate to a non-equilibrium
strategy.) In order to implement a convex combination of these perfect equilibria as a PCE, Player 1 would
need more than just three messages.
As remarked in the Introduction, an important unresolved issue is that of providing a uniform bound on
L. One way to answer this question is to provide a bound on the dimension of the message space required
to implement a PCED, i.e., to show that there exists a number k (that depends only only the cardinalities
of the strategy sets of the players) such that every PCED can be implemented using a message space with
at most k messages.
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